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My name is James Reber, my office is called the Office of Intelligence Coordination. I wasn't here yesterday, I did see the bill of fare that you were fed. I did get a report on some of the things that were presented to you. In fact, I feel my speech should have come just after the General's because they stole all of my thunder yesterday and the first 20 minutes of my speech I now have to lay aside because you have heard it. This means you will get a break earlier than you would have, however.

All of the bodies in the Federal Intelligence System have been pointed out to you yesterday. You have been told that the General, the Director of Central Intelligence, has as one of his main responsibilities the coordination of the constituent agencies in the IAC as well as other agencies where they run into intelligence activities. The Office of Intelligence Coordination doesn't take General Smith's place in that. As you have listened to the various speakers, people who perform functions, and you will hear more of those, you are quite aware, as Mr. Andrews just illustrated in reference to the State Department on biographic intelligence, that each of these functional Assistant Directors has a responsibility for coordination. I do not do their coordination. Therefore, you must ask yourself if I don't do the General's coordination and I don't do the Assistant Directors' why have an Office of Intelligence Coordination? This is, indeed, a legitimate and obvious question.

My mission is to assist the Director in carrying out his very big problem of coordination and to assist the Assistant Directors in carrying

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out their jobs, their parts of the total job.

I was trying to think of a word that would sort of capture my function so it would be brought out of the bureaucratese so frequently used. The word occurred to me as I drove home last night - maybe I am a catalytic agent. I thought, however, I had better check in the dictionary before I used the term. I couldn't find catalytic as such in my abridged dictionary, but I did find catalysis. That definition reads: "Chemistry used in that connection: acceleration of a reaction (originally applied to decomposition only) produced by the presence of a substance (called the catalytic agent or catalyzer) which it appears to remain unchanged." And then I thought, well, I cannot use that because surely I cannot have as my objective the decomposition of anybody or anything, and finally it is erroneous to conceive that one in my position can, in fact, remain unchanged for at times should I, without intent, engage in some decomposition you can at once see that my colleagues may change me considerable.

As you were told yesterday I think I am supposed to help the General in the functions of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. I am the secretary and that means I try to do well all those things which will facilitate and make more effective group deliberation. If the heads of the intelligence system are engaged in substance, as indeed they are, and as Dr. Langer will point out in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates, this is a concern of the IAC. If these heads are administratively responsible for the functions under them, and of course they are, and if these functions have relationships to one another, then problems involving those relationships at some point become and must become cognizent to the IAC itself.

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This last statement of mine delineates the primary area of my concern. I am dealing with relationships. I am not a substantive expert in anything and so all the relationships with the other agencies and the ramifications of those down into the bodies of each become my concern, though not my responsibility in the functional sense.

Now, perhaps, if I would give you two or three illustrations which are not meant to describe how much I have achieved, nor to persuade you that I do it all, nor to give you the impression they are necessarily typical, but these are three of the kinds of problems that I have been dealing with since December:

As you know, one of the offices you will hear about if you have not already, is the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Now the problem here, and for that office, is how does it take leadership in order to bring together as systematically as possible all the research efforts in the scientific field? For as you know various agencies of Government require for their own operational use certain intelligence located by their side. To try to get all of this coordinated in the past there was established a Scientific Intelligence Committee. It has been operating now for some time and has under it a number of subcommittees. From my peregrinations both here and in the other agencies I have become aware, as in fact the people in Scientific Intelligence are aware, that while this has many successes to its credit there is a feeling that there is something more needs to be done. In fact, on the part of the other agencies there may be a feeling of "you are doing too much" because you must remember that people whom Dr. Chadwell works with in the other agencies are administratively responsible up stairs, at the same time that he, for the Director, is trying to coordinate their various research and collection activities in the field of scientific intelligence. These

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two points of views there are and both are genuine and proper. But how you know where to stop and where to begin on these becomes a knotty problem. Now, what have I done about this? Only this, I have sat down with Dr. Chadwell and his people and tried to understand what they are trying to do with the other agencies. Why they are trying to do it. What efforts have they made to achieve it. Why do they think they haven't succeeded, as well as what are the successes. By virtue of looking at and talking with the other agencies I bring to bear not necessarily something Dr. Chadwell doesn't know but I am sort of an outsider who has an interest. An interest in the problem, not an interest in taking anything away from Dr. Chadwell. I am not a scientist. I got "D" in physics so you can see I couldn't rate, but this is a problem of not "what" so much, though it is involved, but it is the "how." So my interest in my office and that of my office is in the "how" do you get on with the job."

Take another illustration: During the last war there was an effort to collect in the Theater of War documents, materials, and of course, the interrogation of personnel - these for intelligence purposes. There were considerable difficulties because there had been no systematic planning whereby the OSS interest and the military's might both be settled. In fact in sufficient planning to even ensure that one, the military which had jurisdictional control, would be satisfied. There has, therefore been recently planning "how do we get a system so that we will get a maximum of these kinds of sources available most systematically and effectively, not only to the military who obviously need them to prosecute the war, but also the other agencies of the Government for kinds of intelligence research which are perhaps not as immediate but no less

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Carey in the Office of Operations. You heard his presentation yesterday. These are three subjects within the three areas or divisions that you heard about. The original staff work for plans of this sort were generated in the JIG, Joint Intelligence Group, under the JCS, and were subsequently referred to this Agency for the coordination of the views of the non-military agencies, and it is my lot to try and produce not only what this Agency thought about those proposed structures for these purposes, but also to see what could be done in getting coordination with State, AEC, and FBI. We did, obviously, the first thing first: found out where we stood and discovered that this Agency considers that all of the three items mentioned are indeed thought of, if not legally laid down, as services of common concern. Therefore, this Agency should represent them in the Theaters of War as well as in the Zone of the Interior in order to get the most effective operation. When we got into the discussion with the other agencies it became clear that one of them preferred to retain old and sturdy liaison arrangements with the military and no matter how persuasive we tried to be we were not successful in finding language which would bring that agency into the agreement which we eventually reached. When we were all done, however, with all that we could do and knew what principles we wanted established, it then became the question of "can this be practicable in the views of the military" and that was discussed with them and ^{an} arrangement come upon and the matter was then referred to the IAC. The only trouble was they couldn't come to a decision that day because there is a broader question that is in the mill at higher levels that ~~were~~ ^{had} to be settled first, so mine and George Carey's feeling was, a bit, these two are not exactly related. We would very well like to get these done, but I guess we will have to get this done. So three weeks hence we will have the bigger question and then

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in the face of that we will have the other bigger question. All of which may represent several things. Among others the longevity of the coordinating process, the multiplicity of the views, ambitions, and fears that grow out of functional responsibility in each agency and its desire to carry and play a big role, and finally the fact that you cannot always settle one question as complicated as it is outside the framework of a bigger question. What I have told you is not exceptional, it is not even exceptional to the intelligence process. This is a typical kind of thing in the United States Government where functions have been for good reason, and in some not so good, mixed up and where in order to achieve public policy they must all be brought together quickly as possible and effectively enough so that you not only have a hope of getting the job done, but hope of genuine cooperation in the implementation by each party - and let us not ever forget this last. Decisions can be laid on, sweeping ones, but unless there is some hope that you can get all the people to implement in good will and with strength there will be reservations² that you won't succeed.

A final illustration, briefly: As you know, under the NATO there is going to be some military activity, there has to be some intelligence provision and there has been proposed some kind of structure under NATO to take care of intelligence. Here you have a problem in which the military, through its American member on the International Group, ~~is~~ studying the question sought to get each agency's views separately from the group. There are many who claimed that there could be nothing more inefficient than a committee or a group, but if at times you will inspect what is achieved by other methods which are more difficult to trace you will find its rival. In this particular case the Colonel in the military used the rival approach. He picked out each of us, he got back each of

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our comments, he spent endless hours in bilateral discussions, frequently on the same basic question which in my judgment could much more swiftly have been aired and the margins of difference been identified. We returned our views, as most of the other agencies, but there now comes the question, since you have settled this big or first overall question of how the intelligence structure under NATO shall be, then there is the complicated question of how do you so gear and manage the Federal Intelligence System in the United States that it does discharge its functions in regard to NATO. We now come up to that one. I have proposed to the Colonel that he use the facilities of the IAC or its staff members to do some preliminary identification of what are the views of each of us. I don't know that he will acquiesce. I do not suggest that so CIA can run it. I suggest it because in their interest it would probably be quicker and out of it may grow a much greater understanding of each others position and difficulties than handled separately. I don't mean to argue that you want to solve every problem with ten people in the same room. I am saying that we can by a sharp discrimination of issues define the problem and by keeping to the subject, which means good group management, and keeping clearly in mind the locations of the responsibility for decision we can move ahead effectively. We in this Agency in regard to our relations with the other agencies, of course, rely on many techniques.

In conclusion you can see that my job is to try and find the problems in this Agency with other agencies. Primarily that is where I start. I have to understand the functions they have and we have. You would say, well, aren't all the problems pretty clear, and I would say, maybe the main ones are. There are a lot of them that aren't and something has to be done about some of the problems faced with

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a less productivity than the requirement of our time demands.

Thank you very much for your attention. Are there any questions that you can ask and I can try to answer? I think I have a few minutes left.

Thank you very much.

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Observations on JQR's Training Program Speech

A. Technical

In general, reaction is favorable. Delivery was clear, deliberate, and almost flawless. There were only half a dozen slips, and that in a talk of this length and character is good. They probably indicated a well-disguised tenseness. The talk was a little "folksy" in one or two places, and there were a few sprinklings of corn which failed to take root. The voice had a "weary" quality and lacked the vibrant enthusiasm which is most successful in a presentation of this sort. The quality of the voice was otherwise good.

B. As to Content

The beginning was excellent (except for the old chestnut about throwing away the first 20 minutes of his talk); it was well geared to the audience, whose ignorance of operations must be assumed. For such an audience a talk should avoid detail, which is seldom retained, except as pointed to illustrative purposes. It is most effective to make a single main point and drive it home. Such a point was that which summarized OIC's concern as being with "relationships". There was a tendency, as the talk developed, for the speaker to forget that the audience was one of neophytes who presumably knew little about CIA beyond what had been given them in the past 24 hours. This tendency was observed in the increasing use of technical references and agency initials whose meaning could not justly be assumed as common knowledge.

The structure was good: general statement, development, illustration, and conclusions. The initial development of the concept of the coordination function from the title of the office was effective, with its indication of the metes and bounds of OIC's true function. This was the place (Pass-
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ing swiftly over "catalysis") to develop the "relationships" idea, as the central core of the entire talk, both with respect to the IAC function and more generally.

With respect to illustrations, they should in general be pointed up, with a minimum of detail. In this talk detail was too extensive; interest probably flagged because the audience could not have known enough about the problems cited to have followed them with enthusiasm or total comprehension. Generally no more illustrations should be introduced into a talk of this kind than would justify themselves either in reiterating a main theme or in providing clear prototypes of basically different problems. These didn't quite succeed in doing either. The handling of the OSI illustration was by far the best; one wondered just what the other two proved to the stranger. In them, it was as if JQR were talking to his own staff rather than to a group of indoctrinees.

There were several valuable points sandwiched in between captured sources and NATO, where I suspect they were lost to most hearers; they might more effectively have been worked into the earlier development of the functions.

The humor in relation to defining catalysis was a bit drawn out, but fetched laughter (of a quiet, reserved kind) at one point. The more spontaneous humor, such as the D in physics, should have got a laugh, but was apparently lost on the audience, which by this time was on something less than the qui vive, due, of course, to preceeding speakers.

As to conclusions, these should have been a bit more forceful and could have been more adroitly introduced than by "... in conclusion ...". They could have been somewhat more precise and should have included the valuable point on "relationships".

I most certainly recommend that JQR continue to give these talks as long as the other AD's do. To judge from Max Millikan's talk (the only other I heard), JQR has no apologies to make. If the other AD's slough these obligation off onto underlings, probably JQR should do likewise for prestige reasons, but for no other!

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A year ago I made an innocent comment to [REDACTED] to the effect that there was some loose thinking among some of us about services of common concern. The penalty of that careless remark is now being visited not only on me but on you. The moral is, I presume, that he who opens his mouth should beware lest he get his feet on the platform.

In preparation for my penalty I followed the advice which I heard recently at a civic meeting in my community. An excited young chap, full of his subject and moved to make a speech, paced back and forth in front of the group and urged them to leave no sturn untuned. I have at least turned over a lot of stones, but in the last moments have worried lest I hand you the stones instead of what I thought I found under them.

Before assaulting my text, which is the fourth responsibility of the DCI and CIA, I want to congratulate you, Col. Baird and the training office for providing these orientation conferences. At a minimum they seem to me to challenge both speaker and pupil to take stock of why we're here, where ~~we~~ we've been and what's ahead. This involves the examination of our responsibilities which are probably as important but not always as clear as we like to think.

1. The architects of the Act: the single agency versus the multiple agencies
 - a. they existed
 - b. they are needed
2. The need was for a System, Leadership and a framework for evolution.
3. That part of the legal text x which provides this framework is the fourth of the Director's responsibilities: To perform for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.
4. This phrase will bear examination:
 - a. It is not a legal phrase -- or a phrase of art
 - b. No common law or statutory precedent prior to Act of 1947
 - c. Its subtleties lie in administrative sense--the functions of intelligence organizations, their relationship.
 - d. It implies that the service is directed toward intelligence--not policy or operations--thus suggests support activities such as collection and handling of raw information and until recently has been mainly so interpreted, judging from services established. Two caveats here:

(1) The fact that the NSC directs indicates the

relation, even if indirect, to national security and

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its policies--in the field of economics we are in the research field.

(2) It implies that more than one intelligence organization is affected--thus of common interest

5. How does an intelligence activity get to be a service of common concern?

- a. Wishing does not make it so--though thinking helps--our sense of the system, our attitudes help.
- b. It is not created by striking a rock with a rod or by a flash of high level lightning--though this we may sometimes desire.
- c. Rather it is the result of long and tortuous (and sometimes torturous) negotiation which rests on extensive experience, administrative and cooperative.
- d. It has been agreed to by the IAC
- e. It has been approved by the NSC
- f. Then it is directed. Of the 16 NSCID's, 8 bear on our

subject and they account for an extensive part of the
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CIA organization.

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In general terms, why have our services of common concern come to be:

- a. Others did not want to bother with them--marginal--
though not dispensable--and obviously part of a balanced system.
- b. They could not--money in the long pull
- c. Obvious but useless competition among departmental services and dangers to security
- d. Obvious advantage of central and reliable dissemination to all
- e. CIA has so conducted its own internal support functions as to explore how to be most useful to the community of ~~the~~ intelligence.
- f. The other agencies have gained confidence in our purpose and ability

It is necessary at about this time to mention a counterweight to our imagination and zeal in seeking out new services of common concern.

By the first directive the purposes ~~x~~ of such coordination for which the Act was drawn should be primarily to strengthen the over-all governmental structure and that primary departmental requirements should be recognized and receive the cooperation and support of CIA.

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The injunction is clearly not to just tolerate--but to support.

Some of our activities which serve the community but are not services of common concern:

- a. The industrial register
- b. The graphic register
- c. Sovmat
- d. Markings collection and analysis
- e. OSI

Why aren't they? They have not been designated by the NSC.

Then what is their status--how are they recognized by the community?

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6.



7. OO/C

- a. Detailed NSCID and why
- b. State suggestion for investigation -- 1946
- c. Coordination antedates the service of common concern
-- the importance of the central machine index of sources
- d. The committee -- means of advice
- e. The license--Navy and interrogation of ships' crews

8. Scientific Biographic

- a. Only directive which refers to paragraph 4 of the Act
- b. Primary not exclusive
- c. Soviet Men of Science
- d. Army's file -- extensive - discontinue - file turned over -
Wright field - yet but cooperation

9. Clandestine

- a. Not preclusive. Recognizes need of a theater for
operational purposes
- b. Problem of agreed activities
- c. IAC subcommittee for guidance

(8)

10. Defectors

- a. Not separate services of common concern but refinements of the contacts and collection responsibilities

11. Economics

Economic intelligence under the system created by law and amplified by the third Directive is produced by each agency according to its need. Because of the disparate character of the governmental efforts in economic intelligence, the National Security Council two years ago requested that a survey be made of these resources requesting recommendations with regard thereto. The resulting Directive, No. 15, directs the Agency to produce, as a service of common concern, ~~foreign~~ foreign economic intelligence not provided by other agencies in their discharge of regular departmental missions and assigned intelligence responsibilities, and to fulfill requests of the IAC. This directive ^{adequately} may not provide for an integrated approach to economic intelligence in the community. At least more needs to be accomplished toward this goal. In addition, CIA is to review requirements for such economic intelligence as relates to the national security, develop regular procedures to see that the full economic knowledge and technical talent in the government is brought to bear on important issues involving national security, and identify gaps in foreign economic data. The DCI, with the concurrence of the IAC, established the Economic

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Intelligence Committee to assist in accomplishing these objectives.

The hard core of the functions of CIA thus are seen to be services of common concern, as defined by the NSC in pursuance of paragraph 4, which authorizes the establishment of services of common concern when it is clear they can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

12. Handling of Foreign Language Materials

- a. In development for five years--importance of post mortem on China
- b. Other agencies not excluded from activity
- c. The Advisory Committee as a condition as well as an assistance

A common fallacy in our thinking--that a service of common concern must be total and exclusive--not true in fact--not wise in theory--not practicable in all cases. This flexibility is trying to many of us who look for clear and undiluted authority, free of the impediments of relations with our friends. We cannot escape it, for the architects of the Act of 1947 intended a system, and our successive and successful leaders have built a system.

Conclusion:

At the outset, I theorized that the drafters of the National Security Act could have solved the government's intelligence problem by creating a single intelligence agency to meet all the needs of the

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government. That they did not is clear from the Act, and why they did not is, I trust, evident from what I have been ~~saying~~ saying.

They did, however, create a new agency, and they gave it the deceptive name "CENTRAL Intelligence Agency." This is a deceptive name because this Agency is central only in that it is the center of an interrelated system of interdependent intelligence agencies. Its Director is responsible for providing leadership to ~~the~~ the community. It is also "central" in one other sense, namely: insofar as it performs services of common concern, ~~about~~ about which I trust we now know more. A wider understanding of this limited character of CIA's "centralness" could do much to limit our own disappointment that we do not do more and our friends' possible concern that we do too much.